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in the International Trade Negotiations 
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Buenos Aires, Argentina 
 
Abstract 
 
The results of the Uruguay Round, show that the concessions given by 
developing countries were generally more valuable than those they received 
from industrial countries. I suggest that this outcome is explained by 
aggressive demands from industrial countries, and by the lack of resources 
at the disposal of developing countries. These and other ‘structural factors’ 
weaken the negotiating capacity of developing countries and the outcome 
of their bargaining is likely to be an ‘unequal exchange of concessions’. 
The chapter discusses the costs of these exchanges, and the structural 
factors that help to understand the processes leading to these outcomes. 
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Developing countries have to have the courage to insist that all reasonable doubt as 
to the economic effects of a proposed agreement be removed before they allow a 
decision to be approved. (J. Michael Finger). 
 
 
12.1.   Introduction 
 
The history of the first rounds of multilateral trade negotiations shows that 
the exchange of market access concessions was a process characterized 
by reciprocity and mutual benefits among participating countries. More 
recently, however, the results of the Uruguay Round, where for the first 
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time developing countries negotiated actively, show that the concessions 
given by them were more valuable than those they received. In these 
negotiations, developing countries did not achieve the degree of 
reciprocity expected from the previous history of the trading system. 
This outcome has been explained in part by increasingly aggressive 
demands by industrial countries and in part, by the lack of adequate 
resources of least developed countries. These and other ‘structural 
factors’ such as lack of negotiating experience and inadequate knowledge 
on economic impacts weaken the negotiating capacity of developing 
countries and suggest that in multilateral or regional trade negotiations 
with industrial countries, they are at a disadvantage. The thesis of this 
chapter is that these exchange of concessions are most likely to be 
‘unequal exchanges’. 
Unequal exchanges result in unbalanced outcomes  and  this  can  have 
serious consequences for developing countries and the trading system. 
For developing countries, an unbalanced outcome as measured by the 
difference between the value of concessions given and received has two 
economic costs: (a) the costs associated with a degree of access to foreign 
markets that is lower than the one that would have resulted from balanced 
negotiations, and (b) the costs associated with the weakening of their 
bargaining power implied by ‘excessive concessions’ given in past 
negotiations. For the trading system, unequal exchange negotiations also 
have serious negative consequences. This is illustrated, for example, by 
the ‘implementation’ problems faced by developing countries in several of 
the Uruguay Round agreements which may have not  surfaced  under less 
unequal negotiations. These implementation problems are one of the 
factors that soured relations among WTO members and threatened to 
block the launching of a new multilateral round in Doha (World Trade 
Organization, 2001a). 
The rest of this chapter is arranged as follows. Section 12.2 illustrates 
the significant gains that efficient agricultural producers could reap in 
international negotiations. Section 12.3 takes up the Uruguay Round as 
an example of a negotiation characterized by an unbalanced outcome 
explained in part by an ‘unequal exchange’ process. Section 12.4 delineates 
some of the elements that help to understand why some trade negotiations 
are likely to result in ‘unequal exchanges’. It starts by presenting some   
of the ‘structural factors’ that help to understand the weak negotiating 
capacity of developing countries. The problems associated with this 
weakness are compounded by industrial countries’ ‘aggressive unilateral 
policies’ and their ability to prevail in the definition of the negotiating 
agendas. One of these negotiations involves the MERCOSUR and the 
European Union and in Section 12.5, I use this case to illustrate how some 
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of developing countries’ handicaps appear to be operating in practice. 
Finally, Section 12.6 suggests some preliminary lessons. 
 
12.2.   Economic interests of efficient agricultural 
producers in trade negotiations 
 
The interests of developing countries in the negotiations on market access 
are significant. As an example, I will comment on the gains that efficient 
producers, in general, and Argentina, in particular, could reap by negotiating 
with countries that provide high protection to their primary sectors and 
resource-based manufactures of agricultural origin.1 These are primarily 
industrial countries. As an example, Table 12.1 shows the pattern of 
protection of the European Union (EU) for selected chapters of the 
harmonized nomenclature. These very high levels of protection affect some 
of the goods where efficient producers have a strong comparative advantage. 
In 2000 for example, Argentina’s exports of agricultural and agro-industrial 
products represented 21 and 30% of total exports, respectively. 
 
12.2.1.   Agricultural protection and exports 
By how much would exports increase if this protection would be 
drastically reduced or eliminated? Traditional comparative static trade 
analysis shows that the lifting of agricultural protectionism by OECD 
countries would have a significant impact on exports and GDP. The most 
recent estimates based on the GTAP model suggest that this liberalization 
could increase total exports of goods by a percentage that, depending on 
the underlying elasticities, is at a minimum equivalent to 25% (Casaburi 
and Sa´nchez, 2000). Most of these gains would come from the liberaliza- 
tion of European agricultural trade (Sa´nchez, 2001). 
 
12.2.2.   Agricultural protection and financial costs 
Agricultural protection also increases financial costs. To see how this 
happens, recall that in emerging countries with open capital accounts, the 
market clearing interest rate for the government and most prime companies 
is equal to the risk free rate plus the rate of country risk. On the margin at 
 
 
1 In manufactured products, the comparative advantage of Argentina is determined by its 
factor endowment vis-a`-vis the country or group of countries with whom it is negotiating, as 
well as by the pattern of their protection. Thus for manufactured goods, past research shows 
that vis-a`-vis labor-abundant (capital-abundant) countries, Argentina exports more labor- 
intensive (capital-intensive) manufactured products (Nogue´s, 1985). 
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Table 12.1. Agricultural protection in the European Union 
 
Chapter Name Average Tariffs Maximum Tariffs 
1 Live animals 26.2 106.0 
2 Meat and meat products 33.3 236.4 
4 Dairy products, etc. 40.3 146.1 
7 Vegetables 12.0 140.7 
8 Fruits 9.6 130.4 
10 Cereals 47.3 179.7 
11 Wheat and mill products 24.5 137.8 
12 Seeds, etc. 2.3 67.0 
15 Animal and vegetable oil and fats 8.2 89.8 
16 Meat and fish preparations 18.4 50.1 
19 Cereal preparations 17.9 48.5 
20 Vegetable and fruit preparations 22.7 161.5 
Source: Table AIII.1 in World Trade Organization (2000). 
 
 
this rate, foreign investors are willing to lend. Therefore, if protectionism 
increases country risk, then this implies that domestic borrowers are paying 
interest costs that are above those that would prevail under free agricultural 
trade. 
What are the determinants of country risk? A growing number of 
analytical and econometric studies have analyzed these determinants and 
found that some of the important explanatory variables include (i) growth 
expectations: the higher the growth expectations of an economy, the lower 
the risk of investing in it; (ii) degree of solvency: the higher the burden  
of the debt and the lower the capacity to generate higher levels of exports, 
the higher the perceived degree and risks of insolvency, (iii) structural 
problems: the more serious the structural problems including most 
prominently labor-market rigidities and fiscal deficits, the higher the 
country risk, (iv) contagion: understood as the ‘flight to quality’ triggered 
by the ‘herd instinct’, also raises the country risk when other developing 
countries run into financial problems; and (v) political uncertainty: 
associated, for example, with important differences among leading 
politicians regarding the set of appropriate economic policies, is also 
expected to increase risks. 
While the literature includes a number of cross-country econometric 
studies of the determinants of country risk, few of them have focused on 
single countries. In a recent paper, Nogue´s and Grandes (2001) studied the 
determinants of Argentina’s country risk by using explanatory variables 
discussed above. In our analysis, we chose as the independent variable, the 
spread of Argentina’s sovereign bonds (in this case, the floating rate bond 
or FRB), over the US treasury bond of a similar maturity. The selection of 
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£ £ 
2 
Table 12.2. Exports and country risk, Argentina 2000 
 
Elasticity of Country 
Risk to Debt-Service Ratio 
 Export Losses from 
Protectionism (%) 
 
 25  50 
20.5 10  17 
21.0 20  33 
 
the independent variable was driven by the fact that the most important 
debtor of Argentina is the national government. 
Our study concludes that the elasticity of country risk with respect to 
the ratio of debt service to exports is 20.68. It also concludes that all of the 
other variables mentioned above have a statistically significant impact on 
Argentina’s country risk and enter the regression with expected signs. 
The estimate of this elasticity allows an educated guess of the impact 
of agricultural protectionism on Argentina’s excess interest costs paid by 
both the government and the private sector. Table 12.2 shows simulation 
results regarding the impact of foregone exports due to agricultural 
protectionism on country risk. We use two values of the elasticity of 
country risk with respect to the debt service ratio to exports: 20.5 and 
21.0%. Likewise, based on the study by Sa´nchez (2001), I use two 
estimates of foregone exports due to agricultural protectionism: 25 and 
50% of 2000 exports. The results of this simulation indicate that the range 
by which agricultural protectionism can increase Argentina’s country risk 
goes from 10 to 33%. 
At the end of 2000, the stock of total debt (private and public), stood 
at around $280 billions and for the year, the average level of country risk 
was 672 basis points. Therefore, according to the figures presented above, 
the excess interest costs paid by Argentina’s debtors due to agricultural 
protectionism was at a minimum in the order of $1.9 billion (0.10 672 
$280 billion), or 0.7% of GDP, but it could also be as high as $6.3 billion 
(0.33 £ 672 £ $280 billion). 
12.2.3.   Agricultural protection and growth 
A higher country risk has not only a direct negative financial cost but 
also a dynamic negative effect as higher interest rates slow growth. 
 
 
2 To the extent that some of the debt carries a fixed interest rate, these estimates would need 
to be adjusted. However, the analysis indicates a sizable negative financial costs of 
agricultural protectionism that are over and above the negative effects estimated with 
traditional comparative static trade models. 
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Figure 12.1. Country risk and inter annual GDP growth rate 
 
Source: Nogue´s and Grandes (2001) 
 
Figure 12.1 shows a negative relationship between the level of country 
risk and the quarterly year to year variation of GDP. Obviously, the 
country’s long-run growth performance is explained by other factors in 
addition to the level of real interest rates. This negative growth effect is 
reinforced by the fact that the dismantling of agricultural protectionism 
would improve expected export growth and therefore, expected GDP 
growth that in the Nogue´s and Grandes study (2001) has a very important 
effect on the level of country risk. Summing-up, the negative economic 
and financial consequences on Argentina of agricultural protectionism are 
sizable.3 
 
12.2.4.   Agricultural protection and export prices 
The literature has also stressed the impact of agricultural protectionism 
on macroeconomic instability. This is attributed to the perversity of the 
protectionist policies that attempt to compensate industrial countries’ 
farmers for international price reductions. These compensatory policies 
 
 
3 Argentina has been in recession since early 1999 when its level of country risk began to 
increase steadily mainly due to fiscal imbalances and the weakening of the political base of 
the government. In 2001, this level was above 1000 basis points and after the collapse of 
Convertibility in December of 2001 it has reached and stayed at around 5000 basis points 
which implies that the country has been shut-off from the private financial markets. Mussa 
(2002) presents one of the first assessments of the financial collapse of Argentina. 
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widen the fluctuations of international prices which in turn are transmitted 
as one of the determinants of the economic cycles of efficient agricultural 
producers. For example, between 1997 and 2000, Argentina’s agricultural 
export prices declined by 25% while those of agricultural-intensive 
manufactures, declined by 24%. Not surprisingly, between 1997 and 1999, 
the yearly assistance by OECD countries to their agricultural sectors 
increased from $328.7 billion to $361.5 billion. Much of this assistance 
was provided in order to compensate farmers from the negative income 
effects of international commodity price reductions. In 2000, after several 
years of uninterrupted growth, this assistance declined. However, the 
OECD analysis indicates that this reduction “…reflected international 
price and exchange rate movements rather than major agricultural policy 
changes. There were no major policy reform initiatives…” (OECD, 2001). 
 
12.2.5.   Summing-up 
For Argentina and other efficient emerging producers, agricultural 
protectionism has significant costs that are above those usually estimated. 
I have argued that for developing countries with open capital accounts, 
the costs of the protectionism encountered by their products in foreign 
markets tends to worsen solvency indicators which in turn increases 
financial costs paid by residents and slows the country’s growth rate.4 
These effects, plus industrial countries’ statements that agricultural policies 
could be addressed in international trade negotiations, explain the 
significant interests of the country and MERCOSUR (as well as other 
developing countries), in these negotiations as the way for reducing this 
protectionism.5 
 
 
 
4 Grandes (2001) provides additional evidence of the role that exports play as a determinant 
of country risk in other developing countries. 
5 However, after more than a year of multilateral discussions in the WTO, it is not at all 
clear that industrial countries would implement an important reduction of agricultural 
protection. The public relation campaign supported by the concept of ‘multifunctionality’ 
has been developed precisely to resist liberalization. Also, at the time of writing this article, 
the US Congress is likely to pass another generous farm bill. These actions indicate that 
industrial countries have been successful in ‘building their case’ for continued agricultural 
protectionism. In contrast, developing countries have shown a weak capacity to build their 
case in order to challenge more effectively, developed countries’ protectionist goals. For 
example, the concept of multifunctionality could had been challenged by concepts such as 
‘increased rural poverty’ stemming from agricultural protectionism but efforts like this 
have not been attempted. In spite of all, MERCOSUR continues to put hopes on multilateral 
and regional negotiations with industrial countries as a way of increasing its agricultural 
exports and improving growth performance. 
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12.3.   The unbalanced Uruguay Round 
 
The Uruguay Round is the salient example of an unbalanced negotiation in 
terms of the value of concessions given and received by developing 
countries. In the context of the topic of this chapter, it is useful to recall 
some of the outstanding elements that account for the unbalance. 
 
12.3.1.   The UR promise 
The launching of the Uruguay Round was heralded by most qualified 
observers and multilateral institutions in part because industrial countries 
accepted to include textiles, clothing and agricultural protection on the 
negotiating table. The expectation was that this Round would increase the 
market access opportunities faced by developing countries in developed 
country markets. The promise of these new trading opportunities and    
the lack of negotiating experience help to understand why developing 
countries accepted an ambitious negotiating agenda that included several 
‘new areas’ that had not been the subject of negotiations in the previous 
MTNs. This agenda included services and intellectual property where 
comparative advantage is clearly on the side of industrial countries. There- 
fore, the grand exchange of concessions expected for this Round at its 
launching ceremony can be characterized as one where developing 
countries would liberalize their markets in the new areas of interest to 
industrial countries in exchange for increased market access in agricultural 
and labor-intensive manufactured products. 
The UR results show a clear imbalance between the market opening 
concessions given and received by developing countries. 
 
12.3.2.   The unbalanced UR outcome6 
In order to assess the outcome of the UR, I summarize some of the salient 
features of the negotiations on market access concessions pertaining to 
tariff and non-tariff barriers, implementation problems, services and 
intellectual property. 
12.3.2.1.   Market access 
The outcome of these negotiations can be assessed in terms of (i) the 
proportion of imports whose tariffs are bound and (ii) the depth of the tariff 
cuts. Estimates show that developing country tariff bindings increased 
significantly in the UR, and came close to the incidence of bindings that 
 
 
6 This subsection draws from Finger and Nogue´s (2002). 
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characterizes industrial countries which already was very high before these 
negotiations started (Blackhurst et al., 1996). However, most bindings are 
at higher levels than applied tariffs.7 
Regarding the proportional depth of the tariff cuts, that of developing 
countries has been far more important than that of industrial countries. The 
reason for this is that at the start of the UR developing countries protected 
their markets more than industrial countries and furthermore, several of 
them were implementing significant unilateral liberalization programs. 
The proportional tariff cuts indicates that developing countries’ import 
prices declined by a higher percentage than those of industrial countries 
(Finger and Schuknecht, 1999). 
In regard to non-tariff barriers, the analysis of this UR obligation shows 
that developing and industrial countries have generally complied with this 
obligation. In this area, there are no major differences between industrial 
and developing countries.8 
The market access negotiations included topics where developing 
countries could expect to achieve some form of a balanced outcome. The 
promise that this would be the case is probably the most significant reason 
why developing countries supported the UR negotiations. The fact that in 
these negotiations many of them did not achieve their goals implies that in 
the other topics where industrial countries appear to have comparative 
advantage, the imbalance could only be deepened. In what follows, I 
concentrate on implementation issues, services and ‘intellectual property’. 
 
12.3.2.2.   Implementation issues 
Implementation issues include the problems faced by many developing 
countries in trying to comply with some UR agreements including the 
Agreement on Custom Valuation, the Sanitary and Phtosanitary Agree- 
ment, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade and the Agreement 
on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Compliance with 
 
 
7 As developing countries need to stabilize their trade policies, these bindings entail 
benefits even if unrequited. Nevertheless, according to tradition and the GATT rules, even 
in tariff bindings developing countries should stand firm and demand reciprocity. 
8 Furthermore, while the concessions given by developing countries have already been 
implemented, industrial countries’ concessions still have to be completed (case of textiles 
and clothing), or still has to be negotiated (case of agriculture). The market access 
concessions given by developing countries, and driven mainly from unilateral liberalization 
efforts, have in many cases accelerated their trade and output growth. The dark side of the 
UR imbalance is not here, but in the continued protectionism of industrial countries in 
sectors of the greatest interests to developing countries and also to them as illustrated, for 
example, in Hufbauer and Elliot (1994). 
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these agreements require investment in capital goods, buildings, and 
skills. A preliminary assessment indicates that in order to comply with 
these obligations, some developing countries have to make investments 
that are higher than their combined development budget (Finger and 
Schuler, 2000). 
At the UR, there was no reflection on development needs, development 
stages or development priorities. In many cases, industrial countries 
standards became the ‘international norm’. Pulling the string has created 
serious tensions in the trading system and the hypothesis of this chapter is 
that these problems could had been avoided if negotiations would had been 
less unequal. 
 
12.3.2.3.   Services 
In most services (not all), it is the industrial countries that have the 
comparative advantage to supply them. For example, many services are 
essentially non-tradable and in order for them to be supplied, they require 
foreign direct investment (FDI). Statistics show that these FDI flows 
have come mainly from industrial countries. For these services which 
include areas such as power generation and distribution, gas distribution, 
telecommunications, water supply, finance, etc., industrial countries sought 
the ‘right of commercial presence’ and many developing countries binded 
important concessions of this type (see Hoekman, 1996; Nogue´s, 2001 for 
a more detailed discussion of Argentina). As a partial exchange to these 
valuable rights to ‘commercial presence’, developing countries sought to 
achieve concessions in the area of ‘movement of persons’ but industrial 
countries have refused to negotiate this topic.9 
Again, the bad side of the services negotiations is not the liberaliza- 
tion implemented by developing countries in order to attract FDI. Given 
lack of capital and technical skills that characterize most developing 
countries, if well regulated, these flows of FDI are expected to have 
improved the efficiency of their economies. The bad side is that the 
concessions that were given were unrequited. This bad side is made even 
worse by the fact that apparently, WTO bindings were not an important 
factor  in  attracting  FDI  flows  to  service  industries  (Finger  and  Nogue´s, 
2002). 
 
 
 
9 Note the abysmal imbalance between the multilateral rules that govern international 
capital movements, the abundant factor of industrial countries, with those that govern labor 
movements, the abundant factor of poor countries. On the huge differences in international 
migration flows and the rules that govern them see Lindert and Williamson (2001). 
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12.3.2.4.   Intellectual property: the case of patents 
for pharmaceutical drugs 
The ‘agreement’ on TRIPS was pushed by industrial countries against the 
opposition of several developing countries. This occurred against the lack 
of theoretical and empirical analysis showing that policy reforms induced 
by the TRIPS will increase world welfare, or the welfare of developing 
countries. 
TRIPS covers several ‘intellectual property’ topics. Given the size   of 
the pharmaceutical market and the economic interests at stake, I 
concentrate remarks on patents for pharmaceutical  drugs.10 At the time  
of the UR, the World  Intellectual  Property Organization (1988) listed  
48 countries, most of them developing, as not providing patent protec- 
tion for pharmaceutical drugs. Argentina and Brazil have been included 
in this list. In the event, all contracting parties to  the  GATT/WTO  
signed the single undertaking UR agreement that included the TRIPS 
stipulating that patents should be available to innovations in all activi- 
ties, and should last 20 years from the date of filling. 
The patent section of the TRIPS has more to do with the issue of 
appropriations of the rents generated in developing countries than with 
concerns regarding their innovation and growth potential. In countries 
with a sizable share of the pharmaceutical market supplied by domestic 
companies like Argentina, Brazil and India, the introduction of patents 
will result in a significant transfer of rents to industrial countries’ 
pharmaceutical  companies  (Nogue´s,  1993).11 
Finally, it is of interest to recall that as late as the 1970s and 1980s, 
several industrial countries still did not provide patent protection to 
pharmaceutical drugs. For example, France introduced patent protection 
for pharmaceutical drugs in 1960; Germany in 1968; Japan in 1976; 
Switzerland in 1977, and Sweden and Italy in 1978. In these countries, 
 
 
10 Pharmaceutical drugs is one of the industries for whom patent protection is important as 
an incentive for investing in R&D. Pharmaceutical drug companies have one of the highest 
ratios of R&D to sales and most drug products can be easily copied. Nevertheless, given 
that the average costs of marketing a successful drug stands in the hundreds of millions of 
dollars (some estimates put it in the order of $400 – 500 million) there are very few 
enterprises if any from developing countries with the financial strength to undertake R&D 
activities at this scale. This is why in this industry, patents in these countries will most 
likely, not result in greater innovation. 
11 A recent estimate based on data for 2000, suggests that Argentina could end up 
transferring rents from granting patents to pharmaceutical drugs in the order of $425 
million per year (Nogue´s, 2001). Since October 2000, when Argentina began to grant these 
patents, these rent transfers have begun to increase. 
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patents were introduced when the size of their pharmaceutical drug 
companies was such as to make the likelihood of drug innovation from 
investments in R&D high. Patent protection was implemented somewhere 
along the development process and it was always a domestic policy 
decision taken without regard to foreign interests. For developing countries 
after TRIPS there is no such independence. For them the adjective has been 
‘pirates’ and on this word, an intelligent public relations campaign was 
built by international companies.12 
 
12.3.3.   Broken promises and principles 
The 1986 Ministerial Declaration that launched the Uruguay Round is an 
example of political correctness. Where promises had to be made they 
were made and where principles had to be listed they were listed. The 
problem came later when the outcome of the negotiations showed that 
significant promises and principles had been broken. If there is a new 
multilateral round, the lesson is that promises in the Ministerial 
Declaration do not matter that much. What in fact will matter is the 
capacity of developing countries to oversee that promises and principles be 
respected because there is no one who will do the job for them. Reminding 
some examples from the UR will help to illustrate. 
12.3.3.1.   Promise of agricultural liberalization 
The 1986 Ministerial Declaration asserts that “Negotiations shall aim to 
achieve greater liberalization of trade in agriculture and bring all measures 
affecting import access and export competition under strengthened and 
more operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines…by improving 
market access through inter alia, the reduction of import barriers…”. The 
data and sources cited above indicate that this did not occur. What 
happened? 
Some of the core elements of the Agreement on Agriculture included 
the substitution of non-tariff barriers by ad valorem tariffs equivalents 
and for industrial countries, the reduction of these tariffs by 36%. Analysis 
undertaken on the substitution of NTBs with tariffs suggest that developed 
countries used the opportunity to declare base tariffs of their UR obligations 
 
 
12 Before the TRIPS, developing countries in particular granted patent duration of differing 
length, and in some industries including pharmaceutical drugs, where the satisfaction of 
basic needs was an important consideration, they also distinguished between process and 
product patents. Clearly, different countries decided their structure of IPRs policies in terms 
of what they perceived to be in their interest in much the same way as most developed 
countries have always done. 
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that in general were higher, sometimes  several times higher, than  the  ad 
valorem equivalents. In fact, there have been instances where the height of 
tariff declared to the WTO were such that their reduction by 36% would 
imply tariff rates that today are higher than the ones prevailing before the 
UR. These ‘dirty tariffs’ were the norm and not the exception (Hathaway 
and Ingco, 1996).13 
 
12.3.3.2.   Transparency 
On transparency, the 1986 Ministerial Declaration asserts that: “Nego- 
tiations shall be conducted in a transparent manner…”. In many cases, 
transparency was not there. The agricultural dirty tariffs are one example. 
A second example is found in the implementation of the Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing (ATC). While this agreement has complied with the 
promise in the Ministerial Declaration that the textiles negotiation should 
seek “the eventual integration of this sector into GATT…”, the obscure 
part has been in the implementation where some countries have liberalized 
much less than the notional liberalization indicated in the ATC.14 
 
12.3.3.3.   Reciprocity 
On this, the Ministerial Declaration included the following language under 
Section B on ‘General Principles Governing Negotiations’: 
“Balanced concessions should be sought within broad trading areas 
and subjects to be negotiated in order to avoid unwarranted cross-sectoral 
demands”. Furthermore, “…the  developed  countries  do  not  expect  the 
developing countries, in the course of trade negotiations, to make 
 
 
13 A puzzling question is why did the Cairns Group allow this to happen? The story I have 
been told by an Argentine trade negotiator is that notification of the tariffication exercise to 
the WTO was delivered shortly before the deadline. After more than 7 years, negotiators 
wanted to wrap-up and there was no interest or spirit in adding another round of exercises 
and perhaps negotiations, on what had been a protracted round. 
14 The problem lies in the meaning given to the expression ‘integrate into the GATT’ which 
is to certify that a textile or clothing product is clean of restrictions to trade such as quotas 
that for other manufactured products are illegal under the GATT. According to the ATC, 
the indicated proportions are applied to 1990 imports from a list of textile and clothing 
products that runs some 30 pages long. During the first stages, countries can choose which 
products in the list they ‘integrate into the GATT’. This list includes the products where at 
least one industrial country has chosen to protect with GATT illegal instruments under the 
MFA. Since not all countries protected all of the products in the list, they can choose to 
integrate into the GATT those products which they were not protecting with quotas. As a 
result, so far liberalization by industrial countries has been smaller than the notional 33% 
that should had been liberalized by now (Finger and Nogue´s, 2002). 
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contributions which are inconsistent with their individual development, 
financial and trade needs…”. 
This section has argued that reciprocity, in the tradition of the first 
seven rounds of the GATT, was not there. 
 
12.3.4.   Summing-up 
The UR broke with the GATT principle of “…reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous arrangements …” (Preamble to the GATT). This was the 
first multilateral round where developing countries participated actively 
and the results show that even in market access concessions many of 
them including the efficient agricultural producers, never came close to 
achieving a balanced exchange. The imbalance in market access was 
worsened by (i) agreements requiring socially unprofitable investments in 
order to comply with ‘obligations’, (ii) unrequited concessions in services 
as still no  agreement  has  been  reached  to  regulate  the  ‘movement  of 
persons’, and (iii) forced adoption of specific intellectual property 
standards. Two major factors appear to explain this imbalance: 
developing countries’ structural negotiating weaknesses interacting with 
historically aggressive demands by industrial countries. These and other 
factors, discussed in greater detail in Section 12.4, help to understand 
why the UR represented the milestone example of ‘unequal exchange’   
in international trade negotiations between industrial and developing 
countries. Finally, in order to reach an unbalanced UR outcome, 
important promises and principles of the multilateral system had to be 
broken. 
 
12.4.   Management, knowledge, agenda and other handicaps 
of developing countries in international trade negotiations 
 
In this section, I summarize some of the handicaps that developing 
countries face in the international trade negotiations. Most of the 
comments draw from the experience of Argentina and in some instances, 
other MERCOSUR countries. Certainly not all of these handicaps 
characterize other developing countries but some could be quite extended 
and further research could offer more general findings. 
The negative consequences of developing countries’ handicaps are 
compounded by industrial countries’ clout to set the negotiating agenda, 
and by what has been called, their ‘aggressive unilateralism’ both of 
which are discussed briefly in Section 12.4.2. The Section 12.4.3 includes 
some tentative conclusions. 
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12.4.1.   Some developing countries’ handicaps 
In what follows, I will discuss handicaps associated with the following 
issues: (1) experience and domestic managerial arrangements, (2) the pros 
and cons of negotiating as a member of a trade agreement, (3) lack of 
knowledge on economic impacts of reciprocal concessions in different 
areas, (4) role of the private– public sector linkages, and (5) the impact of 
financial problems on trade negotiations. 
 
12.4.1.1.   Experience and management arrangements 
Many developing countries have given the responsibility of administer- 
ing the trade negotiations to their Foreign Affairs Ministries and in  some 
cases, this may have weakened the negotiating strength. First, in the new 
agenda of trade negotiations, tariffs and non-tariffs barriers are only two 
of the items on the table. Had trade negotiations remained focused on 
these barriers, the decision on which ministry is responsible for the 
negotiations would not had been that serious. But as seen, the negotiating 
agenda that has been expanded considerably since the Uruguay Round 
and now includes a number of topics where concessions granted 
sometimes may result in net costs and concessions received in these same 
areas could be of not much value. Diplomats have not been trained to 
assess the economic dimensions of the increasing number of items that 
are being included in most negotiating agendas with industrial countries. 
As a consequence, they are more likely to agree to unbalanced 
outcomes.15 
Second, most career diplomats are lawyers by training and they do not 
necessarily share the same kind of concerns that economists and entre- 
preneurs might have as they observe a negotiation becoming unbalanced. 
Reaching agreement in a negotiation is usually higher in the ranking 
order of priorities of a Foreign Affairs Ministry, than walking away from 
a meeting because a balanced and mutually beneficial negotiation is not 
being reached. This is more likely to occur when those sitting on the other 
side of the table have ‘political clout’. 
 
 
 
 
15 Obviously, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs are advised by other government offices. 
The problem here is that most of these other offices also have no experience in dealing with 
trade negotiations and often they feel removed from the long-run consequences of the 
advise they may give. In practice, therefore, except for institutionalized interactions with 
the Ministries of Economy, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs often decide by default. 
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Third, the structure of incentives in their careers, implies that diplomats 
usually are keen to obtain a foreign assignment as local wages are 
generally lower than those they receive abroad. Under these circumstances, 
it is a challenge to train diplomats with the goal of transforming them in the 
elite negotiating group of the country. As career diplomats, sooner or later 
they will want to leave for a foreign assignment. 
Finally, Argentina and most developing countries have practically very 
little experience with international trade negotiations. I have no doubt that 
over time the Foreign Affairs Ministries will gain experience, but say 10 
years from now most of the international negotiations now under way will 
most likely have been concluded.16 For these negotiations, the experience 
gained by then will have come too late. 
 
 
12.4.1.2.   The pros and cons of negotiating as a 
member of a trade agreement 
In some of the trade negotiations including those with the EU and in     
the free trade agreement of the Americas (FTAA), Argentina negotiates 
as a member of MERCOSUR. This has one strength and one handicap. 
On the positive side, the fact that in the WTO Brazil has still to bind 
economically important concessions in areas such as services and 
intellectual property implies that the other members are assisted by 
Brazil’s bargaining chips. The extent to which this edge is of value also 
depends on the capacity of Brazil to internalize the gains from the 
concessions it will be giving. 
On the negative side, in the negotiations of the FTAA and with the EU, 
the MERCOSUR members have shown divergent preferences. The reason 
apparently lies in the differences  in  economic  structures  and patterns 
of comparative advantage. Paraguay and Uruguay are more specialized 
economies than Argentina and Brazil which shows, for example, in the 
concentration of trade. Thus, while in 2000 the first five products accounted 
for 28% of Argentina’s exports to the EU, in the case of Uruguay they 
accounted for 49%. 
The consequence of this is that Paraguay and Uruguay are willing to 
close a trade deal with fewer concessions received than is the case for 
Argentina and Brazil. While a few quotas and tariff concessions might 
 
 
 
16 For a country like Argentina, the list includes MERCOSUR– EU, MERCOSUR– US, 
MERCOSUR– FTAA, MERCOSUR– Andean Community and the new Doha multilateral 
round. 
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þ 
create important export opportunities for the first two countries, for 
Argentina and Brazil, it takes more to arrive at an attractive deal.17 
12.4.1.3.   Knowledge and trade negotiations 
As said, for trade in goods, the meaning of a balanced exchange is quite 
straightforward, but in other areas including services, intellectual property 
and many others, the impact of reciprocal concessions is not known and 
economic assessment is not straightforward. As far as I have been able   
to informally assess this problem, many if not most developing countries 
are negotiating without an economic assessment of the probable economic 
consequences of the agreements they may end up signing. This contrasts 
with the situation of industrial countries that apparently know with 
precision what they want to achieve in the negotiations. These specific 
objectives are defined in close consultations with interest groups and in 
many cases they are supported by a good understanding of economic costs 
and benefits. This knowledge comes not only from academic research  
but also from government-financed analysis and what is probably most 
important, from a long experience of close collaboration and exchange of 
ideas between the private and public sectors (Dam, 2001). 
 
12.4.1.4.   Private sector– public sector linkages 
Many developing countries have no tradition of holding consultations 
among public offices and between the public and private sectors for 
defining positions for the international trade negotiations. In the Uruguay 
Round many countries acted more from the basis of binding unilateral 
reforms than from the basis of negotiating an exchange of concessions. 
Now these countries find themselves in the midst of several negotiations 
without the required institutionalized mechanism for private sector– public 
sector consultations. Under present conditions, where many developing 
countries no longer have a clear public support for unilateral reforms, the 
absence of an appropriate consultative mechanism could become a delicate 
problem. To see why, consider that the MERCOSUR has entered into an 
 
 
17 The media has reported several instances where these differences apparently show up. 
Take for example the Presidential statements on the occasion of the first meeting for a 
MERCOSUR– US agreement also known as the 4 1 negotiations. Thus, in an article 
published  by  ‘La  Nacio´n’  entitled  ‘Dividio´  al  MERCOSUR  la  oferta  de  Washington’ 
(August 24, 2001), while President Cardoso is quoted as saying that “…if the US presents 
good proposals, we will accept immediately an agreement, but if it doesn’t do so, we will 
never accept an agreement…”, President Battle from Uruguay is quoted as having said that 
he “…strongly favors a MERCOSUR– US agreement…”. 
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important number of international trade negotiations at a moment where 
the economies of the region are characterized by declining economic 
conditions coupled with very high unemployment rates. This in itself puts 
the private sector on guard against governmental decisions in trade 
negotiations. 
Because of this and other factors, the mandate of the private sector to go 
ahead with ongoing trade negotiations is not all that clear. This position 
plays well with some of the trading partners with whom Argentina and 
MERCOSUR are negotiating. In contrast, Odell (2000) considers that a 
strong backing by the private sector of the US negotiators has been a key 
issue in explaining many of its negotiating successes. 
 
12.4.1.5.   Financial problems and trade negotiations 
Many developing countries are facing difficult debt repayment problems 
which sometimes can become interlinked with international trade 
negotiations in ways that are not the best for the multilateral trading 
system or the individual countries. For example, during 2001, in its road 
to disaster, Argentina walked into the IMF headquarters more often than 
ever before as successive financial arrangements failed to convince the 
international capital markets that things were moving in the correct 
direction. In their efforts to send positive signals, thefinancial  negotiators 
sought a bilateral trade agreement  with the US and  under  the pressing 
economic conditions, they concluded that any deal which could offer a 
signal that exports and GDP will soon start growing was good. For these 
negotiators, the sooner an agreement was signed the better quite 
irrespective of the its ‘content’. In the end, things did not work either on 
the finance or the trade side, but if they would had worked, it is likely that 
the trade agreement would not had been the best for the country simply 
because it would had been negotiated under a pressing debt and financial 
situation that was not receptive to trade negotiations in the interests of the 
real economy. In any case, I believe this example illustrates the existence 
of circumstances where developing countries’ trade negotiations can be 
weakened by pressing financial problems. 
 
12.4.1.6.   Summing-up 
The previous comments illustrate some of the negotiating handicaps that 
can characterize developing countries and it is apparent that some 
handicaps are serious enough to merit a reappraisal of how they should 
approach the trade negotiations. Some of these elements are specific to 
some countries while others could be of a more general nature. These 
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include lack of negotiating experience and appropriate economic 
knowledge of reciprocal concessions in most areas of the trade agenda. 
These and other handicaps require more research and if the hypothesis   
of this chapter is confirmed, then the international community has to 
reassess the wisdom of calling developing countries to participate in 
international trade negotiations without them been adequately prepared to 
sit at the table. 
 
12.4.2.   Aggressive unilateralism and negotiating agendas 
In all of the areas mentioned above, industrial countries hold positions 
that result in a negotiating edge over developing countries. There are two 
other issues increasing their relative negotiating advantage: aggressive 
unilateralism and the ability of industrial countries for setting the 
negotiating agendas. 
12.4.2.1.   Aggressive unilateralism: the case of 
patents for pharmaceutical drugs 
How did TRIPS came to be? The answer probably varies according to 
different types of ‘intellectual property’ protected by this agreement. As 
in the previous section, I will concentrate my remarks on patents for 
pharmaceutical drugs. 
Apparently, the main reason why the patent section of the TRIPS 
agreement is what it is, can be traced to the power of rent-seeking groups 
including the multinational pharmaceutical drug companies. How  did 
this occur? In March 1987, only a few months after the UR had been 
launched, Mr. Gerald Mossinghoff, then President of the US Pharmaceu- 
tical Manufacturers Association (PMA), declared that they were working 
with the US Congress to get it to enact “…the intellectual property 
revisions of the Omnibus Trade Bill that would strengthen the hand of the 
US Government in urging all our trading partners to respect our rights in 
inventions and trademarks…”, (Mossinghoff, 1987), Shortly after, the 
Omnibus Trade Act of 1988 was passed which among other things 
adjusted Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act in the direction of making it 
easier to introduce retaliatory trade measures based on “…unfair practices 
of foreign governments which can be unjustifiable, unreasonable, 
discriminating or which burden or restricts US commerce…”. 
According to the legislation, lack of patent protection is an example of 
an ‘unfair practice’, and at the request of the PMA, supported now by the 
new ‘strengthened hand’ of the US Government, the USTR initiated  a 
series of retaliatory actions, or threatened  to  retaliate  against  several 
developing countries that did not provide patent protection for 
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pharmaceutical drugs. These included Argentina, Brazil, Korea, India, 
among others. 
Section 301 and its clones have been called aggressive unilateralism 
(Bhagwati and Patrick, 1990). Powerful economic groups have shown the 
ability of convincing legislators that money redistributed to them by 
forcing ‘appropriate intellectual property legislation’ around the world, is 
money well redistributed. In this sense, 301 is no different than the rents 
internalized by agricultural or textile protectionism. There is no way that 
developing countries can confront successfully aggressive unilateralism 
and when it is present at the negotiating table as it was during the Uruguay 
Round, the negotiations become unequal exchanges. The stick supporting 
TRIPS created serious problems and is a clear example of what can happen 
when some countries are forced to introduce policies with negative 
consequences for their development process. The problems were so serious 
that at one point they threatened to derail the launching of a new round in 
Doha. It was only after the Ministerial Declaration on public health had 
been agreed following a very firm stance by a group of developing 
countries, that the round could be launched (World Trade Organization, 
2001b). 
12.4.2.2.   Negotiating agenda and ambitious demands 
The UR broke the successful GATT tradition of keeping the negotiating 
agenda focused on market access issues. As said, in this round the agenda 
began to be expanded to fit the interests of industrial countries’ powerful 
economic groups.18 In contrast, negotiations among developing countries 
are not characterized by this heavy agenda or if they include items other 
than market access, among themselves they are given plenty of time for 
implementation. For example, the agenda of the ongoing MERCOSUR- 
Andean Group free trade negotiations only covers trade in goods and 
within MERCOSUR, the goal of liberalizing services, is to be achieved in 
the long run. 
Beyond trade in goods, there appears to be no single item  in the 
‘new’ and expanded agenda where developing countries have a clear 
comparative advantage. As said above, this is an a priori that can only be 
cleared with country-specific studies. If true, this would imply that in   
the ‘new agenda for international trade negotiations’, the likelihood that 
developing countries could reach balanced and mutually beneficial 
 
 
18 Exactly what processes explain this expansion is not clear to me. One place to look at in 
the US must be the process of ‘getting the votes for fast track’ where powerful lobbies play 
a successful game (Dam, 2001). 
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agreements with industrial countries is very low. This comment applies to 
multilateral and regional negotiations alike.19 
Not only the agenda but also the demands within each of the agenda 
items are ambitious. Take for example the case of services and 
intellectual property. In services, “…the US believes that FTAA countries 
should negotiate liberalization according to a top-down (negative list) 
approach, whereby all sectors are liberalized except where a particular 
FTAA country negotiates a reservation for a particular sector or 
measure…” Furthermore, the “…United States excludes immigration 
policy and access to employment markets from the scope of the services 
chapter of the FTAA agreement…”. Certainly, a very ambitious demand 
that is nowhere counteracted by an equally aggressive demand by the 
Latin American countries (http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/ 
services.html). 
In the patent section of the intellectual property negotiations, the US 
proposal requires “…FTAA countries to grant pharmaceutical patent 
holders an extension on the term of their patents to compensate for any 
unreasonable delay in obtaining marketing approval of their product…”. 
Furthermore, the US proposal requires FTAA countries that “…holders 
of rights be able to recover profits from infringers…”; that government 
agencies be given the “…authority to seize suspected pirated and counter- 
feit goods…”, and that  “…maximum  criminal  fines  are  high  enough 
to deter and remove the incentive for infringement…” (http://ustr.gov. 
regions.whemisphere/intel.html). 
Summing-up, the Uruguay Round implied a significant  shift  from the 
GATT trade negotiating agenda. Both in the multilateral and regional 
trade negotiations the contents of this agenda, driven mainly by industrial 
countries’ interests, continues to be expanded. This implies that trade 
negotiations are more likely to result in unbalanced outcomes against 
developing countries. 
 
12.4.3.   Tentative conclusions 
Developing countries bring to the negotiating table what appears to be 
serious structural weaknesses. In some cases, they simply do not have 
 
 
19 Take for example, the FTAA. The initial agenda agreed in the 1995 Ministerial Meeting 
covered the following items: market access (including non-agricultural tariffs and NTBs, 
rules of origin, customs procedures, standards and safeguards), investment and, 
antidumping and countervailing duties. More recently, the agenda has been expanded to 
include: government procurement, services, intellectual property, competition policy and 
dispute settlement. The Doha agenda is equally or more complex. 
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the resources that are necessary even to attend the discussions. This 
extreme example of ‘unequal exchange capacity’ characterized the 
situation of several least developed countries during the Uruguay Round 
negotiations (Blackhurst et al., 1999). Apparently, these countries were 
asked to sign by the cross and were told that at a later date they would 
receive technical assistance explaining them what it was all about.20 
While more advanced developing countries are in a better resource 
position, they are also handicapped from what appears to be other weak- 
nesses associated with their development stage and lack of experience. A 
closer look suggests that there is some room for improvements including 
management structure and arrangements for the international trade 
negotiations. 
There is also a significant vacuum in the knowledge of probable 
economic effects of exchanging concessions on the vast array of issues on 
the table. I fear that this is a handicap that characterizes many developing 
countries and if so, they are negotiating blindfolded. In this area, more 
research is urgently needed to document this gap but developing countries 
could start now investing in necessary knowledge on trade impacts. 
A third area to look at is the linkages between the private and public 
sector, which also represents a barrier for negotiating effectively. 
Reforms have to be supported politically and for those induced by trade 
negotiations, this requires an efficient public sector– private sector 
consultative mechanism which many developing countries must still 
develop. 
Compare this picture with the apparent situation in the  US  taken 
from the FTAA negotiations: “The US positions were developed with input 
from the full range of federal executive branch agencies…Advise from 
non-governmental sources has been obtained primarily through the formal 
private sector advisory committee system…The US International Trade 
Commission has performed the economic analysis of the probable 
economic effects of an agreement” (http://www.ustr.gov). Clearly these 
differences indicate the existence of a big gap in organizational arrange- 
ments and knowledge between industrial and developing countries. 
If developing countries can strengthen some of the above-mentioned 
areas, they will be in a stronger position to demand reciprocity where it 
corresponds. They will also be in a better position to put on the negotiating 
table the topics that are of their interest and if they cannot prevail, at least 
they will be better prepared to confront ambitious demands for trade 
concessions. 
 
 
20 In many cases, this assistance never appeared or has been clearly inadequate. 
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12.5.   MERCOSUR– EU negotiations: unequal 
exchange in the making 
 
The purpose of this section is to illustrate how the handicaps discussed in 
Section 12.4 appear to be operating in practice. For this I resort to the 
MERCOSUR– EU negotiations that are currently under way. I start by 
providing a brief background of these negotiations. 
 
 
12.5.1.   Background 
In December 1995, MERCOSUR and the EU signed an interregional 
cooperation agreement, that seeks to create a trade zone. Since then, both 
regions have held a number of meetings and in 1999 the Cooperation 
Council, the highest level body of this agreement, launched the preparatory 
work for the negotiations. This work is undertaken by the Biregional 
Negotiating Committee (BNC) which has already met seven times. The 
first three meetings dealt essentially with exchanging information and 
clearing questions. The fourth meeting of the BNC (BNC IV) held in 
Brussels was more substantive in character. Here, the MERCOSUR 
informed that in the negotiations, it was seeking a free trade agreement 
expressing in this way its goal that the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 
should not be an obstacle for establishing a free trade agreement. In turn, 
the EU expressed that it was working with the goal of presenting to 
MERCOSUR in the BNC V, a concrete request and offer for market 
access. This proposal would later show to be far from a free trade 
agreement. 
 
 
12.5.2.   Differing negotiating goals and strategies 
Between BNC IV and BNC V, MERCOSUR drafted adocument  defining 
its negotiating position while the EU completed the preparatory work for 
presenting its proposal at the July 2001 meeting. The MERCOSUR 
document titled ‘Modalities for the Tariff Negotiations’, demanded, in 
line with its goal of establishing a free trade area, that  “…it is necessary 
to establish a reference tariff on the basis of which liberalization would be 
negotiated…”. It further stated that “…specific tariffs, mixed tariffs and 
any other type of tariffs be transformed into an ad valorem equivalent that 
for negotiation purposes, would be the maximum reference tariff…”. In 
reciprocity to this, the MERCOSUR offered to dismantle its common 
external tariff (CET) that is defined on 
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an ad valorem basis, plus any modifications introduced after its 
establishment in 1994.21 
Obviously, in its request to the EU for tariffication, the goal of 
MERCOSUR was that the many trade measures protecting EU agricul- 
tural and agro-industrial products should not be an impediment for the 
negotiations. In essence, by proposing to base market access negotiations 
on transparent equivalent ad valorem tariffs and to negotiate their dis- 
mantling in 10 years, MERCOSUR was offering full reciprocity. In fact 
as we shall see, it was offering more as it was not rejecting to negotiate 
other issues put on the table by the EU, some of which could be of 
doubtful economic interest to the region. 
In contrast, the EU never accepted to negotiate on the basis of 
equivalent ad valorem tariffs. It argued that this would go against the 
CAP, which it has consistently argued, is only prepared to negotiate in     
a multilateral round.22 MERCOSUR in turn argued that its goal was to 
put the regional negotiations on an equal footing for both sides, and not  
to challenge the CAP. In fact, the EU strategy has been to take the 
MERCOSUR to a situation of negotiating specific elements of the CAP on 
a product-by-product basis. The differences between the MERCOSUR 
proposal and that of the EU are significant. 
 
 
12.5.3.   The EU proposal 
At the July 2001 meeting, the EU presented its proposal. In contrast       
to MERCOSUR’s offer for a free trade agreement, it is difficult to see 
how the EU proposal could had been more mercantilist. The following are 
some characteristics of this proposal: 
 
(a)   Both sides should dismantle ad valorem tariffs in a period of 10 years 
but as we shall see this proposal hides an important imbalance in 
market access concessions. 
(b)   With this proposal, the EU ensures free access to the MERCOSUR 
market for manufactured products, the most protected sector of 
 
 
21 The document presented suggestions regarding other ‘technical’ aspects of the 
negotiations. Probably the most important among these other issues was that 
MERCOSUR agreed to follow the EU proposal that the agreement could be implemented 
in 10 years. 
22  In  Nogue´s  (2002)  I  argue  that  it  is  very  unlikely  that  the  Doha  Development  Round 
will result in important rather than cosmetic agricultural trade liberalization of OECD 
economies. 
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the economies of the region, in exchange for what is already a very 
open EU market. 
(c)   In agricultural and agro-industrial products the story is very different. 
Except for few countervailing measures, agricultural protection in 
MERCOSUR is also based on ad valorem tariffs. Therefore, the EU 
proposal to dismantle ad valorem tariffs would also imply a high 
degree of access to the MERCOSUR market for their agricultural 
products but not vice versa. 
(d)   Based on equivalent tariffs, Table 12.1 showed the high levels of 
protection granted by the EU to agricultural and agro-industrial 
products where MERCOSUR has comparative advantage. In addition 
to ad valorem tariffs, the EU imposes seasonal tariffs, specific tariffs, 
mixed tariffs, export subsidies, budget support, tariff escalation, special 
agricultural safeguards and quotas.23 Among all of these policies, the 
EU has offered to dismantle only the ad valorem tariffs. How significant 
is this offer to dismantle ad valorem tariffs? Not very significant. 
(e)   The EU agricultural and agro-industry policies are an example of 
high protection administered in a very intransparent  way.  It can take 
several months to gain a detailed knowledge of this protection and 
then: how much should MERCOSUR ‘pay’ the EU for it to 
dismantle the ad valorem tariff or other components of its agricultural 
protection? The complexity of this problem increases as we go into a 
product-by-product negotiation. Different instruments protect differ- 
ent products but in general, ad valorem tariffs do not provide the bulk 
of protection to agricultural products.24 
 
 
23 Some products of important export value for the MERCOSUR also face sanitary and 
phytosanitary barriers some of which appear to be supported by weak scientific evidence. 
24 The nature of the complexity of EU agricultural protectionism can be seen in two 
examples. The first example is fruits such as pears, apples, oranges, etc. For specific periods 
of the year classified by month or consecutive months, fruits are protected by ad valorem 
and specific tariffs. Given the objective of protecting incomes of their farmers, the EU- 
specific tariffs vary inversely with the level of import prices. The result of this is that for 
pears, for example, there are 10 rates varying between 0 and 10.4%. In addition, specific 
tariffs also vary by time of the year so that the number of possible combinations protecting 
pears is very high. In simulations performed by Argentina’s Secretariat of Trade, the EU ad 
valorem tariff equivalent, including the effects of specific tariffs, protecting pears varies 
between 0 and 77%. In other products like chocolates, protection varies according to 
product contents. Thus, protection for chocolates having 1% starch, 2% fat, 20% milk 
protein and 25% sugar, is defined in a table of codes. For chocolates filled with alcohol, the 
code number is 7161. In another table, this code number defines a specific tariff that has to 
be added to the corresponding ad valorem tariff. Different chocolates have different 
contents and there is a corresponding protection code for each one. 
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(f)   Furthermore, in contrast to the initial MERCOSUR proposal that did 
not exclude any product, the EU proposal excludes around 1000 tariff 
lines of which 781 are products of great export interest for Argentina. 
Estimates of the ad valorem equivalent by the Secretariat of Trade  
for a sample of the excluded products show a high average protection 
of 36% with a maximum of 463%. Exclusion of these products 
significantly reduces the MERCOSUR export potential of a trade 
agreement with the EU. 
(g)   In addition to full access to the MERCOSUR goods markets, the EU is 
demanding (i) full reciprocity in textiles and footwear, (ii) standstill 
and rollback, (iii) for fisheries products, liberalization will take into 
account ‘access to water resources’, and (iv) duties on wine will      
be abolished in the framework of a separate agreement including 
‘protection of geographical indications and traditional expressions’. 
In Argentina, textiles and footwear are two ‘sensitive’ labor-intensive 
sectors. Standstill and rollback have not been  discussed  in detail but 
given the CAP, there is no way that a realistic rollback by the EU can 
offer  gains in market access that could match a similar reform  by the 
MERCOSUR. The details on access to water resources and 
intellectual protection for geographical indications have also not  
been specified but Argentina’s national fishing fleet is not significant 
and, although it has good wines, it has not developed a tradition of 
‘geographical denominations’. Summing-up, reciprocal concessions 
in these areas of the expanded negotiating agenda appear to have 
much greater commercial value for the EU than for the MERCOSUR. 
(h)   In addition, the EU has demanded negotiations on government pro- 
curement and services where it seeks a high degree of access to the 
MERCOSUR markets. In services for example, it seeks access to all 
markets except audio– visual services, national maritime cabotage 
and air transport services. The proposal clarifies that the ‘right of 
commercial presence’ does “…not extend to seeking or taking 
employment in the labor market or confer a right of access to the labor 
market of another party”.25 Regarding government procurement, the 
 
 
 
25 Quote taken from the EU document entitled ‘European Union Working Text: Trade in 
Services’, draft July 2, 2001. As a contrast, most ancestors of argentine nationals were 
Europeans and Argentina was, and by international standards remains, an open immigration 
country. Lindert and Williamson (2001) quantify the significant contribution of Argentina 
as a recipient country of European migration during, what they call, the first wave of 
globalization between 1870 and 1910. Rules on ‘movement of persons’ have certainly 
changed drastically. 
Unequal Exchange 321 
 
presumption is that EU multinationals are better positioned to sell to 
MERCOSUR governments than vice versa. 
 
12.5.4.   Interpreting the EU proposal 
The difference in market access offered by the MERCOSUR (free trade) 
and EU proposals is so big that one wonders what are the underlying 
goals of the latter. For the MERCOSUR the goal has been a free trade 
agreement, while for the EU it has been a mercantilist agreement. How- 
ever, this mercantilism is so unreasonable that under normal conditions 
no country or group of countries should take more than minimal resources 
to reject it. Why did the EU present such an offer? 
One interpretation is that, given the bad economic situation of the 
MERCOSUR region, the EU concluded that it has a chance of walking 
away with a trade agreement in favor of its exporters without its import- 
competing industries having to ‘pay the costs’. A second interpretation is 
that the EU is not really interested in reaching a trade agreement with the 
MERCOSUR and that when it presented its proposal in the July meeting, 
it was simply filling a diplomatic formality. A third possibility is that   the 
proposal represents a negotiating tactic and this is in fact what the 
MERCOSUR has concluded and in line with this, it has agreed to continue 
negotiating. This state of affairs did not change during the sixth and 
seventh meeting of the BNC, this last one held in April 2002. 
 
12.5.5.   Illustrating the working of the handicaps 
Since the July meeting, some events have taken place that illustrate how 
the handicaps listed in Section 12.4 are working in the MERCOSUR– EU 
negotiations. First, preparing a counter-offer to the EU proposal requires a 
high degree of coordination between the public and private sectors. This 
is needed, for example, to determine in which of the possible timetables 
for tariff dismantling that have been decided on a preliminary basis (0, 4, 7 
and 10 years), each product should be included. Both the public and private 
sectors have shown not to be well prepared for this exercise. 
Second, as argued in Section 12.5.4, the discussion within the 
MERCOSUR, has also led to differing interpretations of the EU proposal. 
Thus, while Argentina and Brazil have in general maintained a critical 
stance, Uruguay remains an enthusiastic supporter of the EU offer. As 
said in Section 12.5.4, Uruguay expects more from a product-by-product 
negotiation than do Argentina and Brazil. 
Third, within Argentina, there have been inter-agency differences. 
While  the  trade  negotiators  want  to  maintain  a  strong  stance  vis-a`-vis 
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the EU, others in government fear that this would be risking an ‘important 
opportunity for the country’. 
Fourth, the European lobby has been aggressive in pressing 
MERCOSUR. This lobby includes visits to the region by Mr. Pascal 
Lamy and Mr. Fischler. For example, Mr. Fischler, the EU agricultural 
commissioner, has been quoted as saying that the EU “…has shown to be a 
good client and friend of MERCOSUR…” as it has presented an ample 
offer to liberalize agricultural trade. Furthermore, the EU “…is waiting a 
constructive counter-offer”, and “…it is seeking to arrive at a balanced 
agreement…”.26 Quite sarcastic. 
Finally, there is little if no knowledge of possible economic impact    
in practically all of the subjects that have been put on the table by the  
EU. Except for some aggregate estimates of economic impacts for 
liberalizing trade in goods, there is no knowledge regarding the possible 
effects of negotiating reciprocal concessions with the EU in services, 
government procurement, geographical denominations, access to fishing 
waters, etc. 
 
 
12.5.6.   Summing-up 
The MERCOSUR– EU negotiations represent an example of a negotia- 
tion where on one side of the table are developing countries with their 
handicaps and on the other side are trading partners with  clout  that know 
very well what they want from the agreement, i.e. an example of  an 
‘unequal exchange’ negotiation leading most likely to an unbalanced 
outcome. While MERCOSUR entered this negotiation candidly expect- 
ing to arrive at a free trade agreement, this never appears to have been  
the goal of the EU. Instead, this goal is for a highly mercantilist 
agreement of little economic value in relation to what MERCOSUR 
could internalize in a reciprocal and  mutually  beneficial  agreement.  
The apparent strategy of the EU has been to take the MERCOSUR to 
negotiate on a product-by-product basis: “I give you minimal conces- 
sions and the honor of having completed a negotiation with the EU, and 
you give me your markets. This is a fair deal”. I believe that the  only 
way that MERCOSUR could conclude a reasonable negotiation is by 
standing firm on its initial proposal of negotiating a free trade agreement 
on the basis of clear principles and transparent instruments. 
 
 
 
26  ‘Intenta la UE negociar sobre agricultura’, La Nacio´n October 4, 2001. 
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12.6.   Drawing some lessons 
 
The Uruguay Round opened a divide in the trading system in such a way 
that we can talk of the ‘before’ and ‘after’ it. The GATT trading system, in 
which developing countries did not participate much, was more transparent 
and balanced than the WTO system. In the old system, the weaker 
countries could feel quite assured that the hegemonic countries would not 
make an abuse of their power. This appears to be no longer the case and 
now differences in resources, experience, managerial capacity, knowledge, 
and negotiating strength matter. This matters not only in multilateral 
negotiations but also in regional negotiations involving developed and 
developing countries. Differences in these factors are so important that 
sitting both groups of countries together in international trade negotiations 
is likely to generate an ‘unequal exchange process’ that results in 
unbalanced outcomes with costs to developing countries and the trading 
system. This analysis indicates some suggestions. 
 
12.6.1.   Principles in trade negotiations 
It would appear that one way of modifying at least partly the outcome of 
these negotiations, would be to go back to respect the fundamental GATT 
principle, now included in the WTO, of negotiating on the basis of 
reciprocity and mutual benefits. Who should ensure that this basic principle 
is respected? The answer is that it is up to the developing countries to 
defend their interests which takes me to a second suggestion. 
 
12.6.2.   Blocking negotiations: a defensive strategy 
This one is borrowed from Mike Finger in a personal communication: 
“Developing countries have to have the courage to insist that all reasonable 
doubt as to the economic effects of a proposed agreement be removed 
before they allow a decision to be approved”. This is a defensive strategy 
that, if repeated every time there is ‘reasonable doubt’, might eventually 
generate forces in favor of rebalancing the odds in trade negotiations. 
 
12.6.3.   Management arrangements, knowledge 
and other domestic reforms 
In addition to ‘blocking’, developing countries should look into their 
negotiating arrangements. In some, there appears to be room for improving 
the management and skills allocated to the negotiations. They can also 
increase their internal cohesiveness by inter alia, strengthening the public 
sector– private sector consultation process. Additionally, with relatively 
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few resources, developing countries can gain greater knowledge on net 
gains associated with reciprocal negotiations in the different areas of the 
agenda. These are some suggestions which I think would strengthen the 
negotiating capacity of developing countries. 
 
12.6.4.   Congressional oversight 
I have argued that many countries are ill equipped for meeting the 
challenges of trade negotiations successfully and this implies that they are 
assuming risks that are higher than necessary. In these circumstances, as 
is the case in the US, the Congress of developing countries could assume 
the responsibility of providing an oversight function to ensure that the 
negotiations undertaken by the Executive Power are balanced and, in fact, 
result in a mutually beneficial exchange of concessions for their countries. 
Such an oversight role would hopefully result in a better outcome and 
would also strengthen the negotiating positions of developing countries 
vis-a`-vis developed countries’ trading partners. 
 
12.6.5.   Aggressive unilateralism 
Regarding the trading system, the ‘implementation problem’ encountered 
by many developing countries is  the  result  of the  ‘unequal  exchange’ 
in the Uruguay Round negotiations where industrial countries knew with a 
high degree of precision what they were signing and developing countries 
often did not have a clue. One message of this chapter is that if these 
types of exchanges are not rebalanced, the trade negotiations will continue 
generating ‘implementation and other problems’. In this regard, one salient 
characteristic of the Uruguay Round negotiations was the presence of 
‘aggressive unilateralism’. We live in a new world where the strengthening 
of core economic interlinkages between countries, are a core ingredient  
of successful diplomacy. These interlinkages are also built in trade 
negotiations but if these are to be successful, aggressive unilateralism 
must go and give room  to  a  constructive  dialogue between  countries in 
different development stages. This dialogue should be open enough    to 
define agendas of interests to all countries without the presence of a big 
stick. 
 
12.6.6.   Learning more about decision mechanism 
Ever since the completion of the Uruguay Round, well-intentioned 
researchers, politicians and other people of influence have been suggesting 
ways of ‘fixing’ the trading system. This research has uncovered many 
problem areas that have led to several reform proposals. If the hypothesis 
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of this chapter is correct, the suggestion is to take this research one step 
back and ask what elements of our decision-making mechanisms explain 
why the system evolved from negotiations with reciprocity and mutual 
benefits, to ‘unequal exchange negotiations’. I believe we need to get a 
better grasp of this if we want to make suggestions for lasting reforms to 
the nature of negotiations. On the developing country side, I have 
supported my thesis of ‘unequal exchange’ by looking into some of the 
elements that characterize the decision process of a few developing 
countries. It is crucial for this research to incorporate industrial countries as 
well. We need to enquire, for example, about the underlying forces that 
explain why these countries have been moving away from the basic GATT 
principles they once created and protected. Is, for example, the process of 
‘buying the votes for fast track’ important for explaining the expansion of 
the trade negotiating agenda? 
 
12.6.7.   ‘Smoke and mirrors’ of trade negotiations 
versus unilateral reforms 
For some developing countries, the potential gains to be achieved by 
participating in international trade negotiations are very high. This comes 
out very clearly for efficient agricultural producers. Because of these gains, 
many developing countries appear to be paralyzed by the promise of these 
negotiations and may have put aside unilateral reforms. Nevertheless, 
developing countries must learn to see behind the ‘smoke and mirrors’ of 
these negotiations. 
The lesson here is that in the absence of reforms to the process of 
multilateral trade negotiations, the priorities of these alternative strategies 
have to be reassessed. Many developing countries have to assume that they 
will gain little in this process and put unilateral reforms again as national 
priorities. Developing countries should continue implementing all the 
necessary liberalization reforms supported by their societies, but they 
should consider binding in the WTO only those that bring clear economic 
gains. Binding additional concessions, as many did in the Uruguay Round, 
should be considered only in the event of clear reciprocity. 
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